Erroneously Conferred Eligibility under the Family and Medical Leave Act by Johnson, Nikolas D.
North Carolina Central Law Review
Volume 26
Number 2 Volume 26, Number 2 Article 3
4-1-2004
Erroneously Conferred Eligibility under the Family
and Medical Leave Act
Nikolas D. Johnson
Follow this and additional works at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by History and Scholarship Digital Archives. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Central Law Review by an authorized editor of History and Scholarship Digital Archives. For more information, please contact jbeeker@nccu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Johnson, Nikolas D. (2004) "Erroneously Conferred Eligibility under the Family and Medical Leave Act," North Carolina Central Law
Review: Vol. 26 : No. 2 , Article 3.
Available at: https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol26/iss2/3
ERRONEOUSLY CONFERRED ELIGIBILITY UNDER
THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
NIKOLAs D. JOHNSON*
I. INTRODUCrlON
The workplace has changed dramatically in the last several decades.
Among the changes are more women in the workforce,1 an increasing
number of employees who are classified as single parents,' an overall
aging of the country's workforce,3 and the continuing responsibility
for women in the workplace to be the family's primary caretaker.4
Often these changes force employees to place their family obligation
ahead of job responsibilities.5 Meeting these family responsibilities
often leads an employee to miss more work than permitted by an em-
ployer's absenteeism policy. This may lead to an employer taking ac-
tion against an employee for absenteeism, and could ultimately result
in termination.6
Responding to this growing problem, Congress passed and Presi-
dent Clinton signed into law the Family and Medical Leave Act.7 The
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) permits an eligible employee
to take a leave of absence to address family health care issues8 and/or
certain family events9 and thereby balance workplace demands with
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1. Richard Bales & Sarah Nefzger, Employer Notice Requirements Under the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 67 Mo. L. REV. 883 (2002) [hereinafter Bales & Nefzger].
2. Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654 (2003) (original
version at 107 Stat. 6 (1993)).
3. Bales & Nefzger, supra note 1, at 883.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (2003).
5. Id. § 2601(a)(3).
6. Id. § 2601(a)(4).
7. Robert J. Aalberts, The Family and Medical Leave Act.- Does It Make Unreasonable
Demands On Employers?, 80 MARO. L. REV. 135 (Fall 1996).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2).
9. Id.
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family responsibilities."a The statute applies to employers conducting
interstate commerce who have fifty or more employees 1 who are em-
ployed daily for a minimum of twenty weeks12 in a calendar year and
who work within seventy-five miles of the place of business. 3
Because some employers are unfamiliar with administration and ap-
plication of the FMLA, employees may be told or led to believe that
they are eligible for leave under FMLA when they are not. Upon
discovery of an error, employers often respond to such circumstances
by revoking FMLA eligibility status from an otherwise ineligible em-
ployee. This raises the issue of whether an employer has the right to
revoke FMLA eligibility from an employee for a requested FMLA
leave of absence once the employer has conferred eligibility upon an
ineligible employee.
This article argues that current Department of Labor regulations
prohibiting employers from revoking conferred FMLA eligibility from
statutorily ineligible employees, either due to error or non-compliance
with eligibility notification deadlines, are in conflict with the plain lan-
guage of the FMLA and therefore are unenforceable. Part II provides
an overview of the FMLA, employer and employee eligibility require-
ments under the FMLA statute and Department of Labor Regula-
tions, and the method for judicial review of regulations promulgated
by an agency based on a specific statute such as the FMLA. Part III
reviews significant U.S. Court of Appeals and U.S. District Court de-
cisions concerning current Department of Labor regulations and an
employer's ability to revoke FMLA eligibility from an ineligible em-
ployee. Part IV provides analysis on the issue. Part V proposes regu-
lations that provide recourse for ineligible employees erroneously
granted FMLA eligibility.
II. BACKGROUND
A. FMLA
1. Overview
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was signed into law by
President Clinton on February 5, 1993,14 two weeks into his presi-
dency. The statute became effective six months later.' 5 The statute
permits an employee to balance job responsibilities with family
10. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1).
11. Aalberts, supra note 7, at 136.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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needs. 16 The statute also provides employees with the opportunity to
take a leave of absence from an employer to care for health conditions
for themselves17 and/or qualifying family members 18 and not be sub-
ject to adverse employment actions.19 For a health condition to qual-
ify for coverage under the FMLA it must be "serious."'2 The statute
allows employees to take a leave of absence for family reasons21 such
as the birth2 2 and/or adoption of a child.23 Employees can commit up
to twelve work weeks24 - the equivalent of 480 hours, of leave of ab-
sence on either a continuous or intermittent basis based on circum-
stances25 - towards an FMLA-qualifying health condition or event.
2. Employee Requirements and the FMLA
The FMLA imposes six requirements on an employee desiring to
qualify for time off under the statute. First, an employee must have
worked for her employer a total of twelve-hundred fifty (1250)
hours26 within the previous twelve months before the requested leave
of absence period.27 Second, the period covering a medically related
leave of absence must relate to a "serious health condition. 21 8 A "se-
rious health condition" is defined as a physical29 or mental condition3'
that requires inpatient care at a health-care facility3' or continuing
treatment by a health care provider.3 2 Third, an employee may be
required to provide an employer with medical documentation con-
cerning the requested leave.33 Fourth, the employee can only request
a leave of absence under the FMLA to care for herself 4 or for quali-
fying family members.35 Qualifying family members include: (a) the
employees' parents;36 (b) the employee's spouse;37 and (c) the em-
16. Bales & Nefzger, supra note 1, at 886.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2).
18. Id.
19. Bales & Nefzger, supra note 1, at 883.
20. Paula J. Dehan, Has the FMLA Been Stretched Beyond Its Intended Scope?, 29 N. Ky.
L. REv. 629 (2002) [hereinafter Dehan].
21. Bales & Nefzger, supra note 1, at 886.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2).
23. Dehan, supra note 20, at 629.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).
25. Id. § 2612(b)
26. Id. § 2611(2)(A)(ii).
27. Id. § 2611(2)(A)(i).
28. Dehan, supra note 20, at 629.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(11).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 2611(11)(A).
32. Id. § 2611(11)(B).
33. Id. § 2613(a)
34. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (2004).
35. Id.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(C).
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ployee's child.38 The statute also provides that under certain circum-
stances a relationship that "in loco parentis"3 9 between the employee
and/or child 41 or parent 4' also are qualified family members. Fifth, an
employee requesting a FMLA leave of absence must notify her em-
ployer of her intention to take a leave of absence on either a continu-
ous or intermittent basis.42 Sixth, an employee must notify her
employer of an intention to have her absence covered by the FMLA.43
The timing of such notice depends upon when the employee be-
comes aware of the need for an FMLA-qualifying absence. If an em-
ployee becomes aware of a need to take an FMLA-qualifying leave
more than thirty days prior to the commencement of the leave, the
employee must provide the employer with at least thirty days advance
notice of the leave's commencement date. 44 However, if the em-
ployee becomes aware of the need for the leave within thirty days of
the leave's commencement, the employee must provide as much ad-
vance notice as is practicable.45
3. Employer Notice of Employee FMLA Eligibility
Congress delegated responsibility for creating FMLA regulations to
the Department of Labor (DOL).4 6 One of the regulations promul-
gated by the DOL addresses the effect of an employer's failure to
satisfy employee notification deadlines for a requested leave of ab-
sence under the FMLA in terms of the minimum 1250 hours worked
and length of service requirements.47 Under regulation 29 C.F.R.
825.110(d), if an employer is informed of a FMLA leave request by an
employee prior to the commencement date of a requested FMLA
leave, the employer must notify the employee of his/her FMLA eligi-
bility status for the requested leave prior to the leave's commence-
ment date.48 Alternatively, if the employee notifies the employer of a
request for a FMLA leave less than two business days prior to the
leave's commencement, the employer must notify the employee of the
37. Id.
38. See Id.
39. See Barron's Law Dictionary 252 (4th ed. 1996), noting that "loco parentis" refers to a
situation in which a person has put herself in the position of a lawful parent by assuming the
obligations incident to the parental relation without going through the formalities necessary for
legal adoption.
40. § 2611(12).
41. § 2611(7).
42. § 2612(e)
43. Id.
44. § 2612(e)(1).
45. § 2612(e)(2).
46. 5 U.S.C.S. § 6387 (2004) (original version in 107 Stat. 23 (1993)).
47. 29 C.F.R. 825.110(d) (1995).
48. Id.
4
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FMLA eligibility status for the requested leave within two business
days of receiving the employee's notice.49
An employer's failure to satisfy either of these employee notifica-
tion deadlines imposed by 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d) results in the em-
ployee being automatically50 and irrevocably5" granted FMLA
eligibility for the requested leave of absence.52 However, several
courts have spoken on the issue of whether this regulation, which pro-
vides for eligibility and irrevocability of FMLA eligibility for a re-
quested leave of absence to an employee that is later deemed
statutorily ineligible for FMLA certification, is congruent with the
FMLA statute.
B. Judicial Standard of Review for Regulations
The judicial standard of review used to determine the validity of an
agency's regulation in regards to the statute from which the regulation
was promulgated was outlined in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council.53 Per the Clean Air Act of 1977,54 the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated regulations for the estab-
lishment of a permit program for the purpose of regulating "stationary
sources" of air pollution.55 These regulations allowed a state to create
their own particular definition of "stationary sources," which in turn
defined groupings for pollution emitting devices into a single classifi-
cation known as a "bubble."56 The District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals invalidated the regulations regarding "stationary sources"
because it found the regulations to be contrary to the Clean Air Act.57
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and found that the
definition for the term "source" was an allowable interpretation of the
Clean Air Act.58
In reaching its decision, the court established a two-part test to be
used for determining whether an agency's regulation is a valid or rea-
sonable interpretation of the statute from which the regulation was
promulgated.59 This test is known by names such as the Chevron
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
54. 42 U.S.C.S. § 7401 (1977).
55. See 467 U.S. at 837.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 842.
58. See id. at 866.
59. See id. at 842.
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Test,60 the Chevron Two-Step,61 or the Chevron Doctrine.62 This first
part of the test requires a court to determine whether Congress has
expressly spoken to the issue that the regulation seeks to address.63 If
Congress has spoken to the issue then their express intent is control-
ling.64 However, if a court determines that Congress has not spoken
expressly to the issue the regulation seeks to address, then a court
must move to the second part of the test. Under the second part, a
court must determine whether the regulation is a reasonable interpre-
tation of the statute at issue.65 A regulation is a reasonable interpreta-
tion of a statute, and thereby a valid regulation, provided there is not
a determination that the regulation is either arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute for which the regulation is address-
ing.66 The next section of this article reviews court how Federal
Courts have addressed the issue of whether an employer can revoke
erroneously conferred FMLA eligibility from a statutorily ineligible
employee.
III. SIGNIFICANT COURT DECISIONS
Neither the U.S. Court of Appeals nor the U.S. Supreme Court has
addressed the issue of an employer's ability to revoke erroneously
conferred FMLA eligibility from an otherwise statutorily ineligible
employee. However, several federal courts have addressed this issue.
The majority view is that employers can revoke erroneously conferred
eligibility from ineligible employees. The minority view is that em-
ployers are precluded from revocation. This part of the article reviews
both approaches.
A. Majority Rule of Revocability of FMLA Eligibility
1. U.S. Court of Appeals Cases
a. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals67 was the first Federal appel-
late court to provide an opinion on the issue of revoking FMLA eligi-
bility from an otherwise ineligible employee.68 Jennifer Dormeyer
requested from Comerica Bank an FMLA leave due to medical issues
60. See Michael Asimov et al., State and Federal Administrative Law 566 (2d ed., West
1998).
61. See id. at 565.
62. See Dehan, supra note 20, at 636.
63. 467 U.S. at 842.
64. Id. at 843.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 844.
67. Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Illinois, 223 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2000).
68. Id. at 582.
6
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with her pregnancy.69 Comerica Bank failed to respond to her re-
quest.70 At the leave's commencement date Dormeyer was an ineligi-
ble employee under the FMLA because she had not satisfied the
minimum hours worked requirement. 71  Dormeyer claimed that
Comerica Bank violated the FMLA by failing respond to her request
for a FMLA leave prior to the leave commencement date, and that
under 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d), she was then automatically made an eli-
gible employee under the FMLA.72 The District Court had dismissed
Dormeyer's claim because it lacked the essential elements for a claim
of a finding of a FMLA violation.73
In affirming the District Court's ruling,74 the Court of Appeals
noted that most of the U.S. District Courts that had addressed this
issue determined that regulation 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d) was invalid.75
Additionally, the Court of Appeals found that the Chevron Test did
not need to be applied 76 in determining the validity of the regulation
because the regulation itself had the effect of changing the FMLA
statute.77 The court also concluded that through this specific regula-
tion the Department of Labor was outside its rulemaking scope of
authority granted to it by Congress.78 This court's rationale has been
adopted by federal courts in Michigan in Alexander v. Ford Motor
Company79 and in Puerto Rico in Caraballo v. Puerto Rico Telephone
Inc. 80
The Seventh Circuit's decision is significant not only because it was
the first federal appellate court to rule on the issue of revocability of
granted FMLA eligibility from an otherwise ineligible employee, 81 but
also because the court's dicta endorsed the possibility of an employer
being estopped from revoking from an ineligible employee already
granted FMLA eligibility.82 The court stated that an employer could
69. Id. at 581.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 582.
73. No. 96-C4805, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 10260 at 11, (N.D. Ill. Jul 15, 1997), affd, 223 F.3d
579.
74. 223 F.3d at 585.
75. 223 F.3d at 582.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 204 F.R.D. 314 (E.D. Mich. 2001). (District Court held that an employer's failure to
timely inform an employee of FMLA ineligibility did not preclude employer from using em-
ployee's ineligibility as a pretext for FMLA eligibility revocation.)
80. 178 F. Supp. 2d 60 (D.P.R. 2001). (District Court held that by promulgating 29 C.F.R.
§825.110(d) the Department of Labor overreached its authority because the regulation, contrary
to Congressional intent, expanded the class of FMLA eligible employees.)
81. Id.
82. 223 F.3d at 582.
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be estopped from revoking the otherwise ineligible employee's FMLA
eligibility if: (a) an employer through its silence concerning eligibility
misleads an employee concerning his/her FMLA eligibility status;83
(b) an employee reasonably relied on an employer's silence as an af-
firmation of FMLA eligibility;84 and (c) the employee was harmed by
the employer's silence concerning communication of FMLA
eligibility.85
b. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered an employer's
right to revoke an already granted FMLA eligibility to an otherwise
ineligible employee in Brungart v. Bellsouth Telecommunications
Inc.86 Robin Brungart began employment with Bellsouth in February
1991.87 On December 1, 1994, she began an unpaid leave of absence
that lasted until September 1996.88 On December 2, 1996, Brungart
requested a leave of absence under the FMLA due to her mother's
heart surgery. 89 Responding to her request, Bellsouth sent Brungart a
letter dated January 16, 199790 stating her request for FMLA coverage
for the December 2 leave of absence had been denied because, as of
the leave commencement date Brungart had not satisfied the FMLA's
minimum work hours requirement. 91 Brungart never disputed that
she failed to satisfy the FMLA's "hours worked requirement" in rela-
tion to her December 1996 leave request.92
In May or June 1997, Brungart requested and was granted FMLA
eligibility for a leave scheduled to commence on July 10, 1997.9' On
July 9, 1997, Bellsouth terminated Brungart for failing to meet per-
formance standards.94 Brungart subsequently sued Bellsouth claiming
FMLA violations. 95 One count of Brungart's suit alleged she had be-
come a FMLA eligible employee 96 and Bellsouth's denial of FMLA
eligibility pertaining to her December 1996 leave of absence violated
the FMLA because Bellsouth had failed, per 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d), to
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 231 F.3d 791 (11th Cir. 2000).
87. Id. at 793.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 794.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 796.
93. Id. at 794.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 795.
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notify her of ineligibility for FMLA within the required two business
days.97 The District Court granted summary judgment to Bellsouth.98
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court.99 In affirming
the lower court, the Court of Appeals found the findings of the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals in Dormeyer persuasive.' ° However,
unlike the court in Dormeyer, the court of appeals concluded that the
Chevron Test was applicable in determining the validity of the regula-
tion.1' Applying the Chevron Test the court, like every other court
except for one,1 °2 found that per Step One of the test that Congress
had expressly spoken to the issue of defining an eligible employee
under the FMLA, 103 thereby making the current regulation invalid by
way of Congress' express intent.1°4
This court also stated that its decision in this case should be seen as
a reaffirmation of its position on this issue 0 5 as held in McGregor v.
Autozone Inc.'" In McGregor, the court invalidated Department of
Labor Regulation 29 C.F.R. §825.208(c)' 7 because it had the effect of
extending the period of FMLA leave available to an eligible employee
beyond Congress' express statutory intent of a maximum of twelve
work weeks. 0 8 The rulings of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals have also been incorporated into an eighth circuit opinion
in Evanoff v. Minneapolis Public Schools.' °9
c. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals provided its opinion regard-
ing revocation of an already granted FMLA eligibility from an ineligi-
97. Id.
98. Id. at 793.
99. Id. at 800.
100. Id. at 796.
101. Id.
102. See 173 F. Supp. 2d at 540.
103. See 231 F.3d at 797.
104. See Id.
105. See Id.
106. See 180 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 1999).
107. See 29 C.F.R. §825.208(c) (1994). (This regulation states that when a FMLA eligible
employee gives notice of his or her intent to take a paid leave of absence, for which an employer
has determined is for a FMLA-related reason, if an employer fails to notify an employee prior to
commencement of the leave that the leave will be counted against an employee's maximum
twelve weeks leave entitlement, such a leave could not be charged retroactively against an em-
ployee's twelve week entitlement.)
108. See 231 F.3d at 797.
109. See Evanoff v. Minneapolis Public Schools, 11 Fed. Appx. 670 (8th Cir. 2001). (Federal
Appeals Court upheld District Court decision to reject statutorily FMLA-ineligible employee's
claim of FMLA eligibility due to employer's failure to comply 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d). The Ap-
peals Court concurred with the District Court that the regulation showed a misuse of Depart-
ment of Labor regulatory authority and contradicted express Congressional intent on the issue
of the classification of a FMLA eligible employee.)
9
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ble employee in Woodford v. Community Action of Greene County
Inc. a0 Iva Woodford was employed by Community Action of Greene
County (CAGC) for approximately twelve years."' On November 18,
1997, she requested a leave of absence under the FMLA"2 due to
stress, anxiety, and depression. The leave was scheduled to commence
on November 17.113 Within the twelve months preceding Woodford's
commencement of this leave she had only worked 816.5 hours.' 14 On
November 19, 1997, CAGC provided Woodford with written notifica-
tion that she was an eligible employee under the FMLA for her re-
quested leave." 5 During this leave of absence, CAGC hired another
person to perform Woodford's duties.' 1 6 On January 15, 1998, while
she was still on leave, CAGC informed Woodford that she would not
be reinstated." 7 Woodford subsequently filed suit against CAGC
claiming FMLA violations."18
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of CAGC n 9
because Woodford failed to satisfy the FMLA hours worked require-
ment prior to the leave's commencement.12 0 On appeal, Woodford
argued that CAGC was precluded from challenging Woodford's status
as an FMLA eligible employee for her November 1997 leave because
CAGC, per 29 CFR §825.110(d), having already granted eligibility sta-
tus to Woodford could not subsequently revoke eligibility.12 1 In af-
firming the lower court's findings, 22 the Court of Appeals followed
the reasoning of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals123 in concluding that the regulation attempts to change the
FMLA by giving eligibility status to those employees that are ineligi-
ble under the statute. 124 The court also agreed with the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits findings that in creating the FMLA Congress ex-
pressly addressed the subject of employee eligibility requirements. 125
The court's findings in Woodford are significant for several reasons.
First, the court agrees with the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits in their
110. See 268 F.3d 51 (2nd Cir. 2001).
111. See id at 52.
112. See id.
113. See id at 53.
114. See id at 52.
115. See id at 53.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id at 58.
123. See id at 55.
124. See id.
125. See id.
10
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invalidation of 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d). The Woodford court also: (a)
agreed with Seventh Circuit that an employer could be estopped from
revoking granted FMLA eligibility from an otherwise ineligible em-
ployee1 2 6 when the criteria outlined in Dormeyer is satisfied;127 and
(b) amplified the call for another regulation by concurring with the
Seventh Circuit on the belief that the Department of Labor should
consider through its rulemaking procedure adopting a new regulation.
The court stated that the regulation should address circumstances
when an ineligible employee under the FMLA takes action in reliance
on an employer's implicit or express notice to the employee of FMLA
eligibility. 128
1. U.S. District Court Cases
a. Wolke v. Dreadnought Marine
In Wolke v. Dreadnought Marine Inc., U.S. District Court in Vir-
ginia spoke to the issue of an employer's failure to meet Department
of Labor regulatory notification deadlines and the employer's ability
to revoke expressly or implicitly granted FMLA eligibility for a leave
of absence requested by an employee who failed to meet FMLA statu-
tory requirements related to hours worked prior to the commence-
ment of the requested leave.12 9 Kevin Wolke had been hired by
Dreadnought in September 1994.130 Upon being hired he was covered
by Dreadnought's health insurance plan.' 3 ' In April 1995, Wolke was
injured in a non-work related accident that left him unable to work. 132
In July 1995, Dreadnought cancelled Wolke's insurance thereby leav-
ing him to resolve any unpaid medical bills.' 33 However, Dread-
nought later reinstated Wolke's insurance coverage for the purpose of
permitting Dreadnought's insurer to pay Wolke's medical bills.'3 4
Wolke subsequently filed suit against Dreadnought claiming that he
was entitled to the protections of the FMLA and that canceling his
insurance violated 29 U.S.C § 2614(c)(1) 135 of the FMLA. 1 36
126. See id at 57.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See 954 F. Supp. 1133 (E.D. Va. 1997).
130. See id at 1133.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 1134.
134. See id.
135. See 29 U.S.C. §2614(c)(1) (2003). (This section of the FMLA statute states that, except
in circumstances when a FMLA eligible employee fails to return to work after an expired FMLA
leave or fails to return to work for a reason other than the continuation, recurrence of, or start of
a serious health condition, an employer must retain the employee's group health plan coverage
for the duration of the eligible leave at the same level as provided to the eligible employee
during his/her period of employment.)
11
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In its answer, Dreadnought stated that Wolke was precluded from
claiming a FMLA violation because he was an ineligible employee
under the FMLA.t3 7 Both parties stipulated that Wolke had not been
employed by Dreadnought for the required twelve months prior to
the commencement of his medical leave.138 In support of his claim,
Wolke claimed Dreadnought's failure to inform him that he was an
ineligible employee within two business days after being notified of a
requested medical leave 39 automatically made him an eligible em-
ployee under the FMLA for this specific requested leave. 4 '
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Dread-
nought.' The court held that 29 C.F.R. 825.110(d) was an invalid
regulation. 42 In finding the regulation invalid, the court referred to
the Chevron Test. 143 Starting with step one of the test, the court found
that Congress had specifically spoken on employee eligibility require-
ments under the FMLA in terms of the required minimum hours an
employee must work 14 4 as well as the time period in which the re-
quired hours must be worked. 145 The court added that the regulation
was contrary to Congress' intent because it had the effect of trans-
forming those employees that Congress specifically mandated as ineli-
gible for FMLA coverage into eligible employees. 146 The court's
decision and rationale in Dreadnaught have formed the basis for con-
clusions that 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d) is invalid in U.S. District Courts in
Oregon,147 in Maryland, 148 and in Texas. 149
b. McQuain v. Ebner Furnances
Employers in Ohio who embraced the majority view and sought to
have the FMLA eligibility revocation preclusion clause of 29 C.F.R.
§825.110(d) declared invalid with respect to an employer's FMLA eli-
gibility notification requirements cited McQuain v. Ebner Furnacess0
as support for their position. Keith McQuain began employment with
136. Wolke, 954 F. Supp. at 1133.
137. Id.at 1134.
138. Id.
139. 29 C.F.R. 825.110(d) (1995).
140. 954 F. Supp. at 1135.
141. Id. at 1138.
142. Id. at 1137.
143. Id. at 1135.
144. Id. at 1135-36.
145. Id. at 1136.
146. Id.
147. See Stewart v. INTEM Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12980 at 14.
148. See Seaman v. Downtown Partnership of Baltimore, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 751, 754 (D. Md.
1998).
149. See Fisher v. State Farm Insurance Co., 999 F. Supp. 866, 870 (E.D. Tex. 1998).
150. 55 F. Supp. 2d 763 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
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Ebner Furnances on July 2, 1989.151 On August 3, 1993, McQuain was
involved in a work-related accident 152 that resulted in several subse-
quent periods of medical leaves. 15 3 One of these leaves commenced
on November 8, 1996.154 At the commencement of this leave Mc-
Quain had not worked 1250 hours in the previous 12 months. 55 On
September 5, 1997, while still on the November medical leave, Ebner
Furnaces informed McQuain that retroactive to September 1, 1997156
his current medical leave would qualify as a FMLA leave of ab-
sence.'57 As McQuain's medical leave continued, Ebner received
medical information dated October 6, 1997158 which stated due to
medical condition, McQuain would be given permanent medical re-
strictions.159 Based on the recently received medical information,
Ebner determined that there were no positions available that would
meet McQuain's medical restrictions.16' Following the determination,
Ebner informed McQuain that he was being terminated effective No-
vember 30, 1997.161
McQuain then filed suit against Ebner.162 McQuain claimed that
his termination was improper. He asserted that Ebner was estopped
from denying him continuing FMLA eligibility for his November 1996
leave because Ebner, per 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d), failed to notify Mc-
Quain that he was an ineligible employee within two business days
from the commencement of his November 8 leave. 163 Ebner
Furnances countered that McQuain was an ineligible employee under
the FMLA. 1
64
The District Court ruled in favor of Ebner Furnances. 165 The court
concluded that McQuain was an ineligible employee under the
FMLA 166 and that 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d) was invalid.167 In reaching
its decision that McQuain was an ineligible employee under the
FMLA, the court applied the Chevron Test to the regulation and de-
termined from step one that Congress clearly stated that a condition
151. Id. at 766.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 767.
154. Id. at 768.
155. Id. at 773.
156. Id. at 768.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 769.
163. Id. at 773.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 776.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 775.
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precedent to an employee's FMLA eligibility is that the employee
must have worked 1250 hours within the 12 months prior to the com-
mencement of a leave. 68 Also, as in Wolke, the court concluded that
the regulation expanded the class of employees eligible for coverage
under the FMLA'69 and such expansion was contrary to the express
intent of Congress, 170 thereby rendering the regulation invalid.'71
c. Nordquist v. City Finance Company
In Nordquist v. City Finance Company a U.S. District Court in Mis-
sissippi addressed the issue of an employer's ability to revoke the
FMLA eligibility of an ineligible employee once the employer has ex-
pressly granted eligibility.172 City Finance Company employed
Deadria Nordquist.' 73 In July 1999, she went on maternity leave.' 74
At the commencement of her leave Nordquist was a FMLA ineligible
employee t 75 based on 29 USC §2611(4)(A)(i). 76 Although an ineligi-
ble employee, Nordquist requested FMLA coverage for her maternity
leave 11 7 and soon received a letter from City Finance informing her
that the she was an eligible employee under the FMLA.'78 While on
maternity leave, City Finance discovered several alleged improper
lending acts made by Nordquist 179 and summarily terminated her.180
Nordquist then sued City Finance claiming they had violated the
FMLA by terminating her for exercising employer-granted FMLA
rights that are provided to an eligible employee. 181
The District Court granted summary judgment to City Finance. 82
The court based its summary judgment finding on the persuasive con-
clusions of an overwhelming number of courts 183 that had struck down
29 C.F.R. §825.110(d).1 4 because it had the contrary Congressional
168. Id.
169. Id. at 776.
170. Id. at 775.
171. Id.
172. 173 F. Supp. 2d 537 (N.D. Miss. 2001).
173. Id. at 538.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. See also 29 U.S.C. §2611(4)(A)(i) (2003) (FMLA is applicable to any employer or
person conducting commerce or an activity affecting commerce who employs fifty or more em-
ployees for each working day during each of twenty or more calendar workweeks within the
current or prior year.)
177. Id.
178. ld. at 539.
179. Id. at 538.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 541.
183. Id. at 540.
184. Id.
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intent of effectively extending FMLA eligibility to an otherwise ineli-
gible class of employees.185 In addition, the court stated that the regu-
lation created an invalid preclusion for employers seeking to revoke
FMLA eligibility from an ineligible employee.186 This case is signifi-
cant because until this court's ruling, revocation of FMLA eligibility
cases had dealt with an implicit granting of FMLA to ineligible em-
ployees due to failures to satisfy regulatory notification requirements.
However, this court's ruling established that despite an employer's ex-
press granting of FMLA eligibility to an otherwise ineligible em-
ployee, if the employee was an ineligible employee under the FMLA
at the commencement of a leave, the employer is not precluded from
subsequently revoking the FMLA eligibility.
B. The Minority View of Judge James G. Carr
1. Miller v. Defiance Metal Products - Minority View Rationale
Months after the Wolke decision, a U.S. District Court in Ohio
weighed in on the issue of an employer's ability to revoke an ineligible
employee's FMLA certification despite failing to satisfy FMLA notifi-
cation deadlines in Miller v. Defiance Metal Products Inc.187 A tempo-
rary agency assigned Lisa Miller to work at Defiance Metal Products
beginning on December 4, 1994.188 On July 24, 1995, Miller ended her
employment with the temporary agency and began a full-time employ-
ment relationship with Defiance.189 On January 30, 1996, Miller
sought medical attention for back, shoulder, and neck pain.1 90 On the
same day, she submitted to her employer a form excusing her from
work for medical reasons. 19' On February 14, 1996, Defiance sent
Miller a letter informing her that it was their opinion that she was an
ineligible employee under the FMLA for her medical leave. 192 Miller
subsequently submitted additional medical excuse forms to Defiance
stating that she would be off work until March 28, 1996.193 On March
18, 1996, Defiance terminated Miller citing absenteeism. 194 Miller
then filed suit against Defiance claiming that her termination was an
FMLA violation. 195
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Miller v. Defiance Metal Products Inc., 989 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
188. Id. at 946.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
15
Johnson: Erroneously Conferred Eligibility under the Family and Medical Le
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2004
2004] ERRONEOUSLY CONFERRED FMLA ELIGIBILITY 103
U.S. District Court Judge James G. Carr ruled in favor of Miller.'96
In reaching his decision, Judge Carr determined Defiance's failure to
satisfy 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d) employer to employee notification dead-
lines precluded them from revoking FMLA eligibility status from
Miller on the basis of her hours worked within the preceding twelve
months prior to the leave's commencement failed to meet statutory
requirements. 197 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Carr reasoned the
regulation could be interpreted as addressing two exclusive issues:198
(a) an employee's required hours worked within the twelve months
proceeding commencement of the leave per the FMLA;199 and (b)
employer to employee FMLA notice of in terms of satisfying eligibil-
ity requirements.2"' The court, in applying step one of the Chevron
Test, found that in terms of an employee's eligibility the regulation
simply reiterates the express intent of Congress via the statute creat-
ing the FMLA2 1 and therefore the regulation was valid in regards to
an employee's hours worked and length of service eligibility
requirements.202
However, Judge Carr reached a different conclusion concerning no-
tification requirements addressed by the regulation. Using step one of
the Chevron Test, he found that the Congressional intent of the
FMLA statute did not expressly address the issue of an employer's
notification regarding an employee's FMLA eligibility.20 3 Thus, in ac-
cordance with the Chevron Test, Judge Carr moved on to step two of
the test.2 4 Applying step two, he found the ineligibility notification
deadline was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the statute creat-
ing the FMLA.2 °5 Judge Carr noted that such a regulation was in line
with the FMLA's purpose of balancing the demands of the workplace
with the needs of an employee's family. 2 6 He added that an em-
ployer's failure to notify an employee of their ineligibility within the
regulation's deadline would frustrate such a balancing act by the
employee.20 7
Based on Judge Carr's application of the Chevron Test, the court
found a regulation which grants FMLA eligibility to an otherwise inel-
196. Id. at 949.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 948.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. 467 U.S. at 843.
205. 989 F. Supp. at 948.
206. Id.
207. Id.
16
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 [2004], Art. 3
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol26/iss2/3
104 NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26:88
igible employee when the employer fails to satisfy the employer regu-
latory notification deadlines in terms of minimum hours of work and
length of service requirements to be a reasonable statutory interpreta-
tion of the FMLA statute and therefore a valid regulation. 2°8 This
court's ruling was significant for several reasons. First, for the first
time a court had gone beyond step one of the Chevron Test in deter-
mining whether 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d) was valid in light of statutory
FMLA eligibility requirements.2 °9 Secondly, this case is the only
known case that has been cited in favor of validating 29 C.F.R.
§825.110(d) in relation to FMLA eligibility being granted to otherwise
ineligible employees.210 Third, this court's findings given a later find-
ing in a similar case by Judge Carr, which will be discussed below.
2. Rocha v. Sauder Woodworking - Judge Carr's Minority View
Abandonment
In 2002 in Rocha v. Sauder Woodworking Co.,211 Judge Carr ad-
dressed the same issue that he had previously addressed in the Miller
case.212 Heather Rocha began working for Sauder on November 1,
1999.213 Beginning on March 7, 2001, she was unable to report for
work due to illness.214 It is undisputed by both parties that at the
commencement of her medical leave Rocha had failed to meet the
FMLA's hours worked eligibility requirements.215 On several occa-
sions between March 7 and March 21, Rocha supplied medical docu-
mentation related to her medical leave.216 On March 21, Rocha met
with Sauder's Human resources Manager Joe Dominique.217 Mr.
Dominique provided Rocha with a leave of absence form218 and told
her that by having a physician fill out the form and returning it to
Sauder2t 9 , this would lead to a granting of eligibility for a FMLA med-
ical leave of absence.22 0 However, at this same meeting,221 Mr. Domi-
nique failed to inform Rocha that she was an ineligible employee
under the FMLA for her requested leave because of a failure to sat-
208. Id. at 949.
209. Id. at 948.
210. 173 F. Supp. 2d 537, 540 (N.D. Miss. 2001).
211. 221 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
212. Id. at 819.
213. Id. at 818.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 819.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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isfy the statutory minimum hours worked requirement.22 2 Rocha re-
turned the leave of absence form on March 29.223 On April 17, Rocha
was terminated for absenteeism.22 4
In support of her claim, Rocha cited Judge Carr's decision in Miller,
in which he validated 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d) by finding it to be a rea-
sonable interpretation of the statute creating the FMLA. 2 5 Rocha
argued that Sauder should have been prohibited from revoking her
FMLA eligibility due to their failure to meet a regulatory notification
deadline.226 In his decision in this case, Judge Carr took the opportu-
nity to state that stare decisis227 does not mean that a court's decision
must be followed for an infinite time period. 2 8 He ruled that employ-
ers could not be precluded from revoking or denying FMLA eligibility
to an otherwise statutory ineligible employee due to an employer's
failure to satisfy notification requirements outlined in 29 C.F.R.
§815.110(d).229 Judge Carr's rationale for overruling his decision in
Miller was not based on his reinterpretation of the regulation via ap-
plication of the Chevron Test. Instead it was the result of the fact that
no other court had positively cited his findings in Miller230 combined
with a universal rejection for the basis of his findings in the Miller
case. 23 1 Having reviewed how U.S. Courts of Appeals and federal
District Courts have addressed this issue, the next section will provide
an analysis of these court decisions.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Court Decisions
In concluding that 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d) is an invalid regulation,
the courts showed an enlightened and logical thought process in ad-
dressing the issue of an employer's ability to revoke erroneously con-
ferred FMLA eligibility. Their rationale was based on the sound
principles that the regulation contradicted Congressional intent and
granted FMLA eligibility to employees that Congress sought to ex-
clude from eligibility. The Second and Seventh Circuits, while agree-
ing that 29 C.F.R. § 825.110(d) is invalid, introduced the possibility
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 818.
225. Id. at 819.
226. Id.
227. See Barrons, supra note 39, at 483, noting that stare decisis refers to a situation where a
court is, "slow to interfere with principles announced in a former decision and often uphold
them even though they would decide otherwise were the question a new one."
228. 221 F.Supp at 820.
229. Id. at 820.
230. Id. at 819.
231. Id. at 820.
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that an employer could be estopped from revoking eligibility granted
to an otherwise ineligible employee. While there were two circuit
courts that addressed the issue of estopping revocation of conferred
FMLA eligibility, all of the courts addressing this issue failed to uni-
formly and adequately resolve an issue of substantial importance.
The unresolved issue is what protections, if any, should be afforded
to an ineligible employee who has acted upon an employer's errone-
ous conferral of FMLA eligibility, particularly when there is universal
judicial agreement that the employer has the right to revoke FMLA
eligibility from an otherwise ineligible employee. The Department of
Labor has not validly addressed employee rights when eligibility is
conferred in error. In light of this and based on the current cases ad-
dressing an employer's eligibility revocation ability, it is incumbent
upon the Department of Labor (DOL) to take action. The DOL
should promulgate valid regulations that provide an estoppel defense
to an employee erroneously notified, implicitly or expressly, that she
is an eligible employee under the FMLA, but who later suffers revoca-
tion of eligibility due to a statutorily ineligible status.
B. Rationale for Estoppel Defense
Employees should be afforded an estoppel defense for revocation
of conferred FMLA eligibility. The prerequisite for such a defense
would be that eligibility was initially conferred due to either employer
error or non-compliance with notification deadlines. There are two
reasons for providing an estoppel defense. First, an estoppel defense
would provide an equitable remedy for wrongly conferred eligibility.
Second, an estoppel defense would require employers to improve
their internal auditing processes related to eligibility compliance.
First, the estoppel defense would provide an equitable remedy to
employees for wrongly conferred FMLA eligibility or eligibility notifi-
cation non-compliance. The courts created a bright-line rule on eligi-
bility revocation solely based on a determination that 29 C.F.R.
§825.110(d) provided FMLA eligibility to statutorily ineligible em-
ployees. Some courts in their decisions were silent of the issue of es-
toppel. Courts addressing the issue indicated through their dicta that
they were not creating a bright-line eligibility revocation rule, and did
not intend to use the rule as an excuse for complete revocation of a
leave of absence.
The courts related estoppel to an employer's right to estop a con-
ferred leave of absence. If the courts were to conclude that an estop-
pel defense applied to a revocation of FMLA eligibility from
otherwise ineligible employees, they would be contradicting express
Congressional intent regarding eligibility under the FMLA statute.
19
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All of the courts made it clear that regardless of the reason for wrong-
ful FMLA-eligibility conference, the employer had an absolute right
to revoke eligibility from an ineligible employee. However, the courts
failed to provide any equitable resolution for employees who find
themselves in situations where the employer either willfully, reck-
lessly, or negligently conferred and then subsequently revoked FMLA
eligibility due to an employee's statutorily ineligibility status.
Providing employees who rely on the employer's conferral of
FMLA eligibility, either through error or notification non-compliance,
with an estoppel defense provides an adequate equitable remedy. The
estoppel defense alluded to by the courts addressing the issue does not
seek to confer FMLA eligibility upon statutorily ineligible employees.
Instead, such a defense would preclude an employer from revoking a
conferred, non-FMLA, leave of absence from an employee who rea-
sonably relied on the employer's implicit or express conference of
FMLA eligibility for the requested leave. Estoppel would give an em-
ployee subjected to eligibility revocation an option to request or con-
tinue a non-FMLA leave of absence, provided the leave complies with
an employer's non-FMLA leave of absence policy. Employees sub-
jected to eligibility revocation deserve such an option because the in-
eligible employee who takes or continues a leave of absence can,
depending on an employer's leave of absence policy, effect the date on
which he or she satisfies the FMLA statute's minimum hours worked
requirement. An FMLA-ineligible employee who takes a leave of ab-
sence can delay his or her date of eligibility if the leave fails to count
towards the FMLA' s minimum hours worked requirement. By al-
lowing the option to take or continue the leave despite FMLA eligibil-
ity revocation provides the employee some control as her date of
FMLA eligibility.
An employer who had, based on the hours worked requirement or
notification non-compliance, wrongfully conferred FMLA eligibility
to an ineligible employee also conferred eligibility because the em-
ployer determined the reason precipitating the requested leave was a
qualifying medical condition or family event per the statute. An em-
ployee estoppel defense would preclude an employer from denying a
granted non-FMLA leave of absence to a requesting employee be-
cause the employer subsequently determines that FMLA eligibility
was granted in error. It is quite likely that upon being erroneously
granted FMLA eligibility, an employee makes arrangements associ-
ated with the granted leave. The arrangements made under non-
FMLA or FMLA leave often take the same form. The arrangements
could range from making and paying for transportation costs related
to an FMLA-qualifying event such as an adoption, to scheduling to
20
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participate in the after-care of a parent following the parent's surgery.
An estoppel defense creates an equitable remedy for the ineligible
employee who would have had the opportunity to make informed de-
cisions concerning financial outlays or other issues associated with the
reason for the leave request if she had been properly informed. The
inequity lies in the fact that the wronged employee by no fault of his
or her own was led to reasonably believe that an FMLA leave had
been granted and is now faced with a non-FMLA leave request. An
equitable remedy is provided by giving the employee the option to
commence or continue the leave of absence under different terms.
The second reason why ineligible employees should have access to
an estoppel defense is that such a defense will force employers to im-
prove their internal audit controls regarding FMLA eligibility confer-
ence and notification compliance. The facts associated with most of
the cases discussed in this article possessed one of two common de-
nominators: (1) the employer failed to realize that the employee re-
questing the leave was a statutorily ineligible employee prior to
implicit or express conference of FMLA eligibility for the leave; and
(2) the employer failed to notify the requesting employee in a timely
way that she was not a statutorily eligible employee. Both denomina-
tors are a direct result of an employer failing to either impose or im-
prove upon internal processes designed to eliminate wrongful
designation or notification non-compliance. An estoppel defense will
place an employer in a position of having to impose or improve inter-
nal controls or to face financial consequences.
An employer estopped from denying or terminating a non-FMLA
leave because of errors on its part is creating non-value added costs,
which negatively affect the employer's profitability. The non-value
costs can come in forms ranging from paying remaining employees
additional and often not budgeted compensation such as overtime pay
or compensatory time off, to hiring additional employees during the
term of an employee's leave. Employers realize that the best way to
attack any cost is to address the process that creates the cost. Unlike
material costs and taxes that an employer often cannot control be-
cause they are not process-oriented, an employer has the ability to
control costs associated with a successfully executed leave of absence
estoppel defense. The employer can address its internal process to
ensure that wrongfully conferred FMLA eligibility is not provided to
otherwise ineligible employees.
C. Rationale Against an Estoppel Defense
There are two reasons why an estoppel defense should not be
adopted. First, such a defense would place an additional compliance
21
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burden upon employers, and at the same time not provide employees
an incentive to monitor their eligibility status. Second, given that the
courts have already adopted a bright line rule on the issue of FMLA
eligibility revocation from a statutorily ineligible employee, the estop-
pel defense places an additional and unnecessary responsibility on an
employer's usually understaffed human resources department.
The first reason for not adopting an estoppel defense is that it shifts
additional burdens of compliance on the employer and fails to pro-
mote employee accountability. Throughout the history of the FMLA,
the burdens of statutory compliance have been placed exclusively on
employers. Burdens imposed on employers include: (a) requiring
them to inform employees of provisions of the FMLA via posting
"rights notices; '232 (b) requiring employers to ensure that its non-En-
glish speaking employees are informed of their FMLA rights;233 and
(c) and requiring retention of documentation related to an employee
and FMLA-related regulations2 34 for a period of at least three
years.235 The employee's sole responsibility in this aspect of the em-
ployer-employee relationship is to inform the employer of a request to
take a leave of absence under the FMLA. By placing an additional
administrative burden upon the employer based on the threat of es-
toppel, employers will argue that compliance continues as a strict one-
way street that always favors the employee. The employer's rationale
for this argument is that there is precedent for employment related
statutes placing some level of burden for compliance on the employee.
For example, the statute creating Worker's Compensation places a
compliance burden on an employee from the standpoint that the em-
ployee must follow prescribed safety measures in order for fully avail
herself of Worker's Compensation payments.
The second reason for not adopting an estoppel defense is that it
places unnecessary and additional responsibility on understaffed
human resource departments regarding an issue already addressed by
the courts. In the era of running streamlined companies, some em-
ployers use Activity-Based Cost Management or ABCM2 36 to manage
costs. In using ABCM, employers place tasks and costs associated
with the tasks into one of two categories, value-added or non value-
added expenses. 37 In recent years human resource departments have
often been placed in the non-value added expense category. Human
232. 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(a) (1994).
233. 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(c).
234. 29 C.F.R. § 825.500(c)-(g).
235. 29 C.F.R. § 825.500(b).
236. Sidney J. Baxendale & Michael J. Spurlock, Does Activity-Based Cost Management
Have Any Relevance For Electricity, FORTMnGHTLY, July 15, 1997, at 32.
237. Id. at 33.
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resource departments in the non-value added expense category are
often provided limited and/or decreasing budgets as well as an inade-
quate level of staffing for completing tasks assigned to the depart-
ment. Employers will argue that an estoppel defense will force them
to allocate additional expenses via more staffing and/or increased
budgets to human resource departments which are already considered
strictly negative costs. Employers will also argue that such spending is
superfluous. Employers will claim the unanimity among the courts in
stating that employers can revoke FMLA eligibility for a leave of ab-
sence from a statutorily ineligible employee extends to the non-
FMLA leave. As a complement to this argument, employers will ar-
gue that once a leave is deemed non-FMLA due to employee ineligi-
bility, the employer then reserves the right to grant or deny an
employee a non-FMLA based on the guidelines of its non-FMLA
leave of absence policy. The next section provides a proposal de-
signed to resolve the issue of revocation of FMLA eligibility from an
otherwise ineligible employee and subsequent employee recourse in a
manner equitable to both an employee and employer.
V. PROPOSAL
In those jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of revocation of
an ineligible employee's FMLA eligibility, courts have acknowledged
that it is the employer's responsibility to be accurate in terms of notifi-
cation and the timing of notification to an employee that the em-
ployee is ineligible under the FMLA. Some courts have even stated
that an employee might have estoppel grounds based on the em-
ployer's notification/confirmation errors and/or failures. However, no
court has been willing to categorically state that an ill-advised em-
ployee has an absolute right to recourse. Since employees lack the
absolute right to recourse, the Department of Labor should promul-
gate regulations addressing employee recourse.
The regulatory changes to 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d) that I propose
would create more of a level field in cases of employer FMLA eligibil-
ity notification non-compliance and erroneous FMLA eligibility con-
ference. The proposed changes consist of: (1) providing erroneously
FMLA-conferred employees a minimal period of unpaid leave to ad-
dress issues precipitating a leave request; (2) requiring employers to
notify ineligible employees of their estimated date of FMLA eligibility
post-eligibility revocation; and (3) requiring agency adjudication on
FMLA eligibility notification and/or erroneous confirmation disputes
prior to judicial review. Following is draft language related to pro-
posed regulatory changes.
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A. Proposed Regulations
1. Proposed Regulation A
Erroneously Granted FMLA Leave Prior to Leave Commencement!
Written Notice of FMLA Ineligibility
If an ineligible employee, per this proposed regulation, makes a re-
quest for a leave of absence under the FMLA and the requested leave
is granted in error by an employer prior to the commencement of the
employee's requested leave, an employer must within five business
days following the date of the request or granting of FMLA eligibility,
whichever is later, provide the ineligible employee with written notice
of his/her ineligibility for FMLA leave.
2. Proposed Regulation A-1
Failure to Provide Written Ineligibility Notice/Employer FMLA Rev-
ocation Rights and Employee Rights Post-Revocation
An employer's failure to provide written notification of ineligibility
within the aforementioned five business days: (a) will not preclude an
employer from revoking FMLA eligibility from an ineligible employee
prior to commencement of the requested leave of absence (b) will re-
sult in, at the discretion of the FMLA ineligible employee, the em-
ployee being presented with the opportunity for up to three business
days unpaid leave for the purpose of addressing issues which precipi-
tated the leave of absence request.
3. Proposed Regulation A-2
Employer Systematic Failure to Provide Written Ineligibility
Notice/Penalties
A systematic pattern of failure by an employer to make the required
employee notification of FMLA ineligibility as deemed by the Depart-
ment of Labor shall be punishable by fines as outlined by the Depart-
ment of Labor and/or revocation of an employer's Federal Contractor
Status.
4. Proposed Regulation B
Erroneously Granted FMLA Leave Following Leave Commence-
ment!Written Ineligibility Notice
If an ineligible employee, per this proposed regulation, makes a re-
quest for a leave of absence under the FMLA and the requested leave
is granted in error by an employer and the employee's leave has al-
ready commenced, an employer must within five business days follow-
ing the date of granting FMLA eligibility or discovery of an
employee's FMLA ineligibility status, whichever is later, provide the
ineligible employee written notice of his/her FMLA ineligibility.
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5. Proposed Regulation B-1
Employer FMLA Revocation From Ineligible Employees/Ineligible
Employee Rights Post-Revocation
The employer upon providing written notice of FMLA ineligibility
may terminate the commenced leave and require the ineligible em-
ployee to return to work within three business days following notifica-
tion of FMLA ineligibility. The employee may allocate the
aforementioned three business days as paid or unpaid leave.
6. Proposed Regulation B-2
Employer's Systematic Failure To Provide Employee Ineligibility
Written Notice/Penalties
A systematic pattern of failure by an employer to make the required
employee written notification of FMLA ineligibility as deemed by the
Department of Labor shall be punishable by fines as outlined by the
Department of Labor and/or revocation of an employer's Federal
Contractor Status.
7. Proposed Regulation C
Requirement of Employers to Provide FMLA Ineligible Employees
with Written Estimate of FMLA Eligibility Date
Within ten business days of providing an employee the required writ-
ten notice of his/her ineligibility for FMLA for a requested leave of
absence, an employer must provide an ineligible employee in written
form an estimated date in which the employee shall become an eligi-
ble employee per 29 U.S.C. §2601. A systematic pattern of failure by
an employer to satisfy the aforementioned notification requirement as
deemed by the Department of Labor shall be punishable by fines as
outlined by the Department of Labor.
8. Proposed Regulation D
Requirement of Agency Adjudication Prior to Judicial Review
Any issues of dispute related to the satisfaction of the above-proposed
regulations shall be first adjudicated by the Department of Labor
prior to the commencement of judicial review.
B. Positive Aspects of Proposed Regulations
There are several positives associated with the outlined proposed
regulations. First, a critical positive aspect of the proposal is that none
of the proposed regulations have the effect of expanding the class of
FMLA statutorily eligible employees. Therefore, the proposed regu-
lations should not run the risk of judicial invalidation under the Chev-
ron Test. Alternatively, if the regulations were subjected to Chevron
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Test analysis, a court is more likely to see the regulations as reasona-
ble interpretations of the statute creating the FMLA. Second, the
proposed regulations do not preclude an employer who erroneously
granted FMLA eligibility to an otherwise ineligible employee or failed
to comply with notification deadlines from revoking eligibility. Third,
by requiring employers to provide a written estimated timetable as to
when the then ineligible employee will become an FMLA eligible em-
ployee post-revocation of eligibility, the proposed regulations impose
upon an employer a duty to reduce the probability of an employee
ending up in repeated circumstances such as those which led the to
litigation discussed in this paper. The proposed regulations should
eliminate circumstances in which an employee is constantly unaware
of when he or she will become an FMLA-eligible employee. Fourth,
the proposed regulations create an exhaustion of remedies standard
that will likely reduce judicial review of individual employee/employer
disputes on this issue.
C. Criticisms of Proposed Regulations
While the proposed regulations have several positive attributes, em-
ployers will point to several negative aspects. First, the regulations
can be seen as placing an additional and unfair burden on an em-
ployer's human resources. Employers will argue that they are being
punished by having to guarantee time off to employees because an
employer either failed to meet notification deadlines or erroneously
conferred FMLA eligibility to an employee who is clearly ineligible.
Employers will argue further that being forced to guarantee time off
to employees under the proposed regulations will create additional
and unnecessary costs. Employers will claim that these costs will arise
because they will have to retain what they consider superfluous em-
ployees to offset an employee's non-FMLA absence. Second, employ-
ers will assert that the regulations will create more FMLA litigation,
particularly with respect to the definition of what constitutes a "sys-
tematic pattern of failure" by an employer pertaining to meeting em-
ployee notification deadlines. Third, employers will claim that
requiring an employer who revokes an otherwise ineligible em-
ployee's FMLA eligibility to both provide the ineligible employee
with a written estimate of a FMLA eligibility date and an official writ-
ten notification of FMLA eligibility creates "non-value added" costs
to an employer's overall "cost of doing business."
VI. CONCLUSION
While attempting to comply with the FMLA in terms of providing
coverage to statutory eligible employees, employers that have errone-
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ously granted FMLA eligibility to statutorily ineligible employees or
failed to comply with regulatory notification deadlines for a leave of
absence have later revoked FMLA eligibility for such leaves. To date,
federal courts on each level that have addressed an employer's ability
to revoke eligibility despite the employer's failure to comply with 29
C.F.R. §825.110(d) have reached several conclusions. First, employers
are not precluded from revoking erroneously conferred FMLA eligi-
bility. Second, an employer's failure to meet an employee FMLA eli-
gibility notification deadline will not automatically preclude
revocation of FMLA eligibility from an ineligible employee. Third, 29
C.F.R. §825.110(d), in its current form, is an invalid regulation in
terms of employee notification deadlines because it is contrary to
Congress' express intent on the issue of employee eligibility require-
ments. Fourth, the regulation is invalid because it creates a new class
of FMLA eligible employees out of an employee classification that
Congress expressly stated was to be excluded from FMLA eligibility.
By invalidating 29 C.F.R. §825.110(d), the courts have in essence
provided a uniform bright-line rule on the subject of an employee's
FMLA ineligibility and the employer's ability to revoke erroneously
conferred eligibility from ineligible employees. While the courts have
seemingly resolved this issue for employers, the same cannot be said
in terms of this issue and its effect on the ineligible employee. Courts
have left unresolved the issue of recourse for employees that have
acted on erroneously conferred FMLA eligibility for a specific leave
of absence. Two federal appellate courts have found that an estoppel
principle may be an avenue of employee recourse, but these courts
decline to state that an effected employee has an absolute right to
recourse. Other federal courts have simply not provided any sem-
blance of uniform guidance on the issue of employee recourse.
This article argues that the Department of Labor can provide the
needed guidance on this unresolved issue. Such guidance would be
through the promulgation of new regulations that do not result in con-
ferring FMLA eligibility on employees that are statutorily ineligible.
These regulations would address issues concerning granting a non-
FMLA leave for a specific requested leave of absence, written esti-
mates of the date on which an ineligible employee is scheduled to
reach FMLA eligibility status, and the provision of written confirma-
tion of the date on which an employee becomes an eligible employee
under the FMLA.
The proposed regulations would maintain the judicially created
rights of the employer in terms of revoking eligibility from FMLA
ineligible employees. In addition, the proposed regulations would es-
tablish absolute rights for FMLA-ineligible employees that have ei-
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ther: (a) taken action in anticipation of a leave due to an employer
failure to meet employee notification deadlines; or (b) commenced
what they thought to be a FMLA-qualifying leave. Adoption of the
proposed regulations would establish an equilibrium between the em-
ployer who seeks the right to revoke or deny FMLA eligibility from
otherwise statutorily ineligible employees and the employee who
seeks to work in an employment atmosphere where he or she can bal-
ance family and job responsibilities.
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